Identity fusion, outgroup relations, and sacrifice: A cross-cultural test by Purzycki, B. & Lang, M.
Identity Fusion, Outgroup Relations, and Sacrifice: A Cross-Cultural
Test
Benjamin Grant Purzycki
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
Martin Lang
Harvard University, Masaryk University
Identify fusion theory has become a popular psychological explanation of costly self-sacrifice.
It posits that while maintaining one’s own individual identity, a deep affinity with one’s group
can contribute to sacrifice for that group. We test this and related hypotheses using a behav-
ioral economic experiment designed to detect biased, self-interested favoritism among eight
different populations ranging from foragers and horticulturalists to the fully market-integrated.
We find that while individuals favor themselves on average, those with higher ingroup fusion
sacrifice more money to other members of their ingroup who are unlikely to reciprocate. We
also find that positive outgroup relations also has a similar effect. Additionally, as outgroup
relations vary considerably across our subsamples, we assess a recently-posited interaction
between ingroup and outgroup relations. This interaction shows no consistent effect at the
individual or sub-sample levels.
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The theory of identity fusion (Swann, et al., 2015; 2009;
2010b; 2014a) has received a considerable attention for its
ability to predict self-expressed willingness to sacrifice for a
group. The visceral feeling of oneness blurs the boundaries
between individuals, fostering close affinity with each other.
In contrast to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979),
fused individuals’ identities are not dissolved by group iden-
tity. Rather, because personal and social identities are func-
tionally equivalent, the retention of personal identity while
fused motivates people to engage in costly pro-group behav-
ior (Swann, et al., 2010b; Swann, et al., 2012). Recently,
Whitehouse (2018) articulated a chain of events where per-
ceived sharedness with groups leads to local fusion which–
interacting with outgroup threats–predicts sacrifice.
Empirical support for the theory is growing. In studies
using the trolley dilemma, fused Spaniards expressed higher
willingness to self-sacrifice in order to save other Spaniards
than their less-fused counterparts (Swann, et al., 2010a).
Fused individuals are more likely to claim they are will-
ing to fight and die for their country (Swann, et al., 2010a;
Swann, et al., 2014a; Swann, et al., 2014b; Whitehouse,
et al., 2017). Evidence from Iraq (Gómez, et al., 2017) and
Libya (Whitehouse, et al., 2014) shows that fusion with a
fighting band creates strong “brother-like” relationships that
are more important than family ties, especially when defend-
ing the group’s sacred values. Further evidence exists from
Morocco and Spain where highly-fused individuals are more
likely to claim support for costly sacrifices devoted to ji-
had and democracy, respectively (Sheikh, Gómez, and Atran,
2016).
As it was originally conceived to explain “extreme” be-
haviors, the bulk of the research focuses on very costly acts
of self-sacrifice. If we assume that “extreme” sacrifice is on
one end of a distribution of costs, it follows that the theory
should cover subtler forms of sacrifice. Indeed, some studies
suggest this is the case (e.g., Swann, et al., 2010b). However,
as a consequence of focusing on extreme behavior, some of
this work (Swann, et al., 2009; 2010a) dichotomizes fusion
scales, thus treating fusion and costs of self-sacrifice as trait-
like characteristics rather than continuous covariates lying on
a spectrum (cf. Gómez, et al., 2011; Jiminez, et al., 2016;
Segal, Jong, and Halberstadt, in press; Swann, et al., 2010b).
Moreover, the bulk of the literature considers self-reports of
willingness to engage in or support of others’ extreme acts
rather than actual behaviors. Importantly, this research has
largely bypassed sampling from traditional, non-state soci-
eties (cf. Swann, et al., 2014a).
Here, we examine whether or not identity fusion, inter-
group relations, and perceived cultural similarity facilitate
costly, sacrificial behavior across eight culturally diverse
field sites. By considering foregoing self-interested gains
through fair impartiality toward members of one’s ethnic-
religious group as a relatively subtle form of self-sacrifice,
we examine whether or not perceive cultural similarity as
well as intergroup relations predict sacrificing money for
one’s group.
Method
To assess the role fusion and intergroup relations plays on
sacrifice, we utilize the Evolution of Religion and Morality
Project dataset (Purzycki, et al., 2016a) that includes data (N
= 592) from eight ethnographically unique field sites (Ta-
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Figure 1. Pictorial scale for group relations. Scale modified from Swann, et al. (2009) which was adapted from Schubert
and Otten (2002). See supplements for question definitions.
ble 1) that cover a diverse range of human societies. Our
sample includes Hadza foragers from Tanzania, horticultur-
alist inland populations from Tanna, Vanuatu, a more market-
integrated coastal sample from the same island, Indo- and
native Fijians, Tyvans from Siberia, Brazilians from Marajó
island, and residents of Porte aux Piment, Mauritius. See
Purzycki, et al. (2016a) and Table 1 for further details of each
sub-sample.
Sacrifice. We measure sacrifice with outcomes in a Ran-
dom Allocation Game (Hruschka, et al., 2014; Jiang, 2013;
Purzycki, et al., 2016b). In this experiment, participants
have two cups designated for specific recipients, a fair, two-
colored die, and 30 coins. They are supposed to think of
which cup they would like to put a coin into and roll the
die. If the die comes up one color, they get to put the coin
into the cup of which they thought. If it comes up the other
color, they put the coin into the opposite cup. Regardless of
their thoughts or the die roll, the outcome should be random
with any given coin having a 50% chance of going to either
cup and therefore follow a binomial distribution. However,
as participants play alone, they can break the rules and favor
one cup over the other. If aggregate allocations deviate from
a binomial distribution, this is indicative of systematic, rule-
breaking favoritism.
In the game reported here, cups were designated for par-
ticipants and a co-ethnic, co-religionist from a geographi-
cally distant community. In addition to their show-up fees
(∼10% a day’s wage), participants kept the coins that landed
in their cups and researchers distributed the money from the
other cup to randomly selected geographically distant indi-
viduals. Participants stood to gain from cheating; they played
alone and could put more coins into their own cup (30 coins
amounted to roughly half a day’s average wage in the lo-
cal economy). Considering all allocations not in their own
cups were going to other people not capable of reciprocat-
ing, playing fairly (or generously) meant actually sacrificing
potential gains with virtually no chance of a return.
Intergroup relations. We measured individuals’ relation-
ships with various groups using a standard visual fusion scale
(Schubert and Otten, 2002; Swann, et al., 2009, Figure 1).
This had the benefit of being comparable across samples that
vary in numeracy and literacy. Participants pointed to the
image (1 to 5; low to high) best representing how emotion-
ally close they were to: (1) their ingroups, (2) geographically
distant co-ethnic, co-religionists, and (3) geographically dis-
tant ethnic/religious outgroups1. We defined outgroups as
“a stranger, non-co-religionist living in a distant (but known)
place.” Note that relationships with outgroups inevitably var-
ied across sites (e.g., some intergroup relations were indif-
ferent whereas other groups had long-standing and often vi-
olent feuds). We also asked how similar participants thought
the distant recipients’ religious traditions were (-2 to 2). See
Table 1 for group-level values of these scales.
Hypotheses. If ingroup fusion leads to self-sacrifice, par-
ticipants with higher ratings of ingroup emotional closeness
should be more likely to sacrifice money to distant ingroups.
Similarly, increased reported religious similarity to recipi-
ents ought to decrease the chances of players keeping more
coins for themselves. Finally, to the extent that low outgroup
relations scores indicate hostility, we should expect an inter-
action effect between ingroup fusion and outgroup relations
where low outgroup scores and high ingroup fusion scores
should predict sacrificing coins.
Model
Here, we: (a) formalize a set of theoretically-focused
models that (b) allows the proposed predictors and their inter-
action to vary across sites (c) in a Bayesian statistical frame-
work that (d) monotonically models scales’ effects. We re-
strict the bulk of our discussion here to four focal model
1While the visual component of the scale was the same across
target groups, we reserve using the term “fusion” for only the in-
group measure and characterize the measure for other groups as
“relations” for the sake of presentation. See discussion and supple-
ments for further elaboration.
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Table 1
Descriptive features of target variables for each field site.
N Site/Ingroup Fusion Outgroup Fusion Coins to Self References
42 Christian Coastal Tannese 4.05 (1.27) Noumeans 1.74 (1.34) 15.32 (2.51) Atkinson (2018)
67 Hadza (regional) 4.71 (0.79) Datoga 1.79 (1.27) 17.82 (4.31) Apicella (2018)
73 Kastom Inland Tannese 4.56 (0.85) Noumeans 2.42 (1.87) 15.93 (3.80) Atkinson (2018)
75 Hindu Indo-Fijians 3.53 (1.47) Muslim Indo-Fijians 3.07 (1.56) 15.07 (2.96) Willard (2018)
65 Marajó Brazilians* 3.96 (1.42) Evang./Cathol. 2.22 (1.58) 15.43 (3.74) Cohen, Baimel, and Purzycki (2018)
95 Hindu Mauritians 4.38 (0.92) Muslim Mauritians 2.28 (1.40) 16.30 (3.32) Xygalatas, et al. (2018)
79 Buddhist Tyvans 3.77 (1.47) Christian Russians 2.25 (1.47) 14.70 (2.95) Purzycki and Kulundary (2018)
73 Yasawan-Fijians 1.99 (0.26) Indo-Fijians 1.01 (0.12) 18.39 (4.98) McNamara and Henrich (2018)
Note. Values are means (standard deviations). *When participants were Catholic, the Ingroup and Distant was Catholic while the Outgroup
was Evangelical (and vice versa). See Purzycki, et al. (2018) and references above for further details and analysis.
specifications (see supplemental for more and further discus-
sion).
We define our four focal models below (see supplements
for further model specifications). Model 1 includes only the
effect of ingroup fusion on allocations. Model 2 assesses the
effect of outgroup relations. Model 3 includes the interaction
between ingroup and outgroup scores, and Model 4 is the full
model that includes ingroup fusion, outgroup relations, their
interaction, and the religious similarity score2.
yi ∼ Binomial(30, pi)
Model 1: logit(pi) = αS (i) + βS (i) gi
Model 2: logit(pi) = αS (i) + βS (i) oi
Model 3: logit(pi) = αS (i) + βS (i) gi + γS (i) oi + ψS (i) gioi






 ∼ Multivariate Normal(µ,SRS)
S =

σα 0 0 0 0
0 σβ 0 0 0
0 0 σγ 0 0
0 0 0 σψ 0
0 0 0 0 σδ

σp ∼ Cauchy(0, 2)
µp ∼ Normal(0, 1)
R ∼ LKJCorr(4)
We model the coin allocations yi out of 30 using a bino-
mial logistic regression with a logit link (note that the formal
model includes all priors and diagonal matrix for Model 4
parameters for the sake of illustrating the full model). The
variables are as follows: gi denotes individuals’ ingroup fu-
sion score, oi is their outgroup score, gioi represents the in-
teraction between the two, and ri is the religious similarity
score.
The subscripts i and s denote individual and field site re-
spectively and S (i) is a function returning the site index of
individual i. Each field site gets its own intercept, αs, and
slope for ingroup and outgroup relations (βs and γs, respec-
tively), their interaction, ψs, and/or religious similarlity, δs.
These parameters are assigned a prior distribution defined by
their respective mean vector µ and covariance matrix SRS. S
is a diagonal matrix of each parameter’s standard deviation,
σp, and R is the correlation matrix. R is assigned a weakly
regularizing prior from the LKJCorr family (Lewandowski,
et al., 2009) where η = 4. Note that the formal definitions
above include all parameters for illustration (i.e., it follows
Model 4, the full model). These models are implemented
using non-centered parameterization. As scales’ values were
ordered categorical, we modelled their effects monotonically
using the brms package (Bürkner, 2017) for R. Across the
specifications reported here, the model sampled quite well
(all Rˆ = 1.00 and all effective sample sizes were quite large).
Results
Figure 2 illustrates the results across four model specifica-
tions (see supplemental for results tables). Across all models,
the main intercept’s credibility interval is entirely < 0. We
can therefore confidently state that on average, individuals
favored their own cups. There is also some notable cross-
cultural variation. For example, Tyvan, Coastal Tannese, and
Lovu participants tended to sacrifice more coins while the
Hadza and Yasawan-Fijians tended to favor themselves.
Ingroup fusion predicted sacrifice. The ingroup fusion
model (Model 1) predicts a 45% (CI = [40-49%]) chance of
sacrificing a coin, holding all other factors constant. It shows
that extreme ingroup fusion (i.e., a value of 5) increases the
chances of sacrificing a coin to 56%. Note, too, the cross-
cultural variation; being from Mauritius shows that higher
values of ingroup fusion predict more self-favoritism while
the direction of the effect is reversed for Brazilians.
2Note that the Hadza did not answer questions about religious
similarity. They are therefore dropped from Model 4.
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As shown in Model 2, the outgroup relations measure also
predicted sacrificing more money to distant ingroup mem-
bers. This model predicts an 8% increase in the probability
of an individual sacrificing a coin when outgroup relations
scores are at their maxiumum. Moreover, this measure had
different effects across sites. This implies that values of the
outgroup relations scale took on different meanings. Among
the Coastal Tannese and Hadza samples, for example, higher
outgroup scores predicted more withholding while the Mau-
ritians and Brazilian samples were more likely to sacrifice
coins to distant ingroup members when outgroup scores were
higher.
Model 3 includes individual (denoted by “In-
group*Outgroup” in the figure) and site-specific (denoted by
“g*o”) effects of the ingroup-outgroup interaction. Holding
all other factors constant, the probability of sacrificing a coin
(i.e., the logistic transform of the main intercept) is 44%, CI
= [40-49%]. The interaction has virtually no association with
sacrifice at the individual level. Site-specific estimates of
the interaction varied slightly, but overall, individuals in any
context are no more likely to sacrifice coins because of the
interaction between ingroup and outgroup relations. Model
4 includes perceived religious similarity to distant players.
Holding all other factors constant, the model predicts
that religious similarity of distant recipients increases the
predicted sacrifice probability by an additional 2% per scale
unit.
Discussion
We confirm here that ingroup fusion can help account for
actual behaviors with cost-benefit consequences subtler than
extreme self-sacrifice (Swann, et al., 2010a; Whitehouse,
2018). Importantly, we also show that the magnitude of the
effect of an individual’s relations with various groups varies
cross-culturally.
While ingroup fusion predicted sacrifice, the effect was
not large. Similarly, perceived religious similarity of recipi-
ents and outgroup relations showed positive-but-slight asso-
ciations with sacrifice. These mild associations might be due
in part to the fact that game rules anchor the experiment’s
outcome around a binomial distribution; the signal from fu-
sion might be clearer using another game that is free from
such constraints (e.g., the dictator game).
We also found a similar effect for outgroup relations. This
raises the distinct possibility that this often-used pictorial fu-
sion scale measures general prosociality rather than fusion
per se. Given how robust its association with sacrifice is
across contexts and studies, coupled with the fact that the
same measure for outgroups predicted sacrifice for distant
ingroups, it serves as an important reminder that multiple
methods and attention to contextual details of intergroup re-
lations is necessary to rule out what exactly this measure as-
sesses.
We found no support for the recently proposed (White-
house, 2018) interaction of ingroup and outgroup relations on
sacrifice (see supplementary section 3.4.2 for an assessment
of the extreme cases). This is likely due to the outgroup mea-
sure; we did not directly ask about negative attitudes towards
outgroups. Furthermore, a signal of the effect may have been
clearer in a similar experiment where participants can di-
rectly benefit their local group–rather than distant ingroup
members–at a cost to themselves. Tyvans played one such
game with a self-local community dyad (see supplements)
but the interaction had no obvious effect. However, they did
show a greater likelihood of giving coins to themselves as
fusion increased. Yet, given that they largely played by the
rules and the cross-cultural variation we reported above, it
remains unlikely that this effect would be consistent across
contexts.
It is also possible that the selected outgroup relations
across the entire sample lacked sufficient variability–or too
much in the meaning of low scores of outgroup relations–to
detect an interaction effect. First, recall that there was con-
siderable variation in outgroup ratings across sites. As our
modelling structure allows such effects to vary across sites,
by implication, cross-cultural differences in the meaning of
outgroup relationships are partially accounted for. Indeed,
that we found that the effect of the outgroup relations mea-
sure varied across sites; cross-culturally, ratings of outgroup
relations were differentially associated with gameplay. If
individuals in two different field sites had very low ratings
for outgroups and these low ratings indicate hostility for one
and no relationship for another, the model allows by-site in-
creases in these values to have differential effects on outcome
within those sites.
Curiously, in the case of the Hadza who have a long-
standing territorial feud with the Datoga and a history of spo-
radic lethal conflict (Marlowe, 2010), larger outgroup rela-
tions scores predicted keeping coins, not sacrificing them. It
is possible that because the Datoga and their herds are en-
croaching on Hadza territory, the overlapping circles may
have been interpreted as negative–i.e., a metaphor for Hadza
being incorporated into Datoga lifeways and territory rather
than emotional proximity. In other words, the closer Hadza
think the Datoga are, the more inclined they are to keep more
money from geographically distant Hadza. If so, the fusion
measure might be too reliant on a spatial metaphor that is
neither universal nor indicative of the same social phenom-
ena for a similarly diverse sample. In addition to having the
prequisite knowledge of participants’ lifeways, having a bet-
ter sense of how participants interpret the scale would rule
out such possibilities.
Further research with more diverse intergroup relations,
nuanced, and more direct measures for outgroup relations
would nevertheless provide more confidence in inference-
making, particularly with respect to how much “fusion”–
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above and beyond general sociability–contributes to sacrifi-
cial behaviors across the cost spectrum and societies.
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Figure 2. Model estimates of coin allocation and 95% credibility intervals. Gray line is at 0.0, the threshold of no effect.
Estimates > 0.0 indicate sacrificing coins through fairer play, while estimates < 0.0 indicate self-interested bias. Site names
are intercepts with varied effects for ingroup (g) and outgroup relations (o) as well as their interaction (g*o). Model numbers
correspond to definitions.
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Over the past decade, researchers have devoted increased attention to the theory of identity 
fusion, which proposes that the psychological state of identity fusion with a group mediates 
individuals’ costly sacrifices on behalf of those groups (Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse, & 
Bastian, 2012). Based on the theory of self-verification (Swann, 1983; Swann & Hill, 1982), 
identity fusion with a group has been shown to predict an array of self-reported pro-group 
behaviors. For example, Swann et al. (Swann, Gómez, Seyle, Morales, & Huici, 2009) have 
shown that participants who select completely overlapping circles to represent their and their 
country’s identities (fused individuals) expressed higher willingness to fight and die for their 
country. Interestingly, while the activation of personal identities had no effect on non-fused 
individuals, it increased the willingness to fight and die for the fused individuals to the same 
extent as activating social identities. The authors interpreted these results as a support for a 
functional equivalency of personal and social identities in fused individuals (Swann et al., 2009). 
In a subsequent study, Swann et al. (Swann, Gómez, Dovidio, Hart, & Jetten, 2010) showed that 
the pictorial indicator of fusion predicted individual Spaniards’ willingness to sacrifice their lives 
to save five other Spaniards. This effect extended even to five other Europeans, but not to 
Americans. Moreover, increasing agency through various manipulation of arousal further 
increased pro-group behavior of fused individuals (Swann, Gómez, Huici, Morales, & Hixon, 
2010). 
 Improving upon the pictorial measure that artificially divided participants into a binary 
category of fused/non-fused, Gómez at al. (2011) created a seven-item verbal measure of 
identity fusion showing that this continuous measure predicts participants’ self-reported 
willingness to fight and die for their country and self-reported willingness to sacrifice one’s life 
to save five other countrymen. Importantly, the relationship between the verbal measure of 
identity fusion and willingness to self-sacrifice was not mediated by decreased desire for self-
preservation in fused participants, but rather by increased devotion to the group (Swann, 
Gómez, et al., 2014). The same authors have also shown that under time pressure, the 
psychological state of identity fusion exerts even stronger effects over individuals’ decisions to 
self-sacrifice for the group (Swann, Gómez, et al., 2014).  
 Further testing of the effects of identity fusion with samples of university students 
across 11 countries revealed robust relationships between identity fusion with one’s country 
and willingness to fight and die for his or her country (Swann, Buhrmester, et al., 2014). This 
relationship holds also during armed conflicts and warfare. Whitehouse et al. (2014) surveyed 
revolutionaries during the 2011 conflict in Libya and found that fusion with one’s battalion 
predicted willingness to engage in extreme behaviors on behalf of the battalion. This effect was 
even stronger for revolutionaries who were more fused with their battalion than with their 
families, suggesting that identity fusion may capitalize on fictive-kinship psychology. Indeed, 
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increasing the salience of genetic relatedness or psychological similarity to other countrymen 
multiplied the effects of identity fusion on extreme pro-group behavior (Swann, Buhrmester, et 
al., 2014), a finding that was further supported by Vazquez et al. (Vázquez, Gómez, Ordoñana, 
Swann, & Whitehouse, 2017) who showed that monozygotic twins are more fused and were 
more willing to make sacrifices for the other twin than dizygotic twins.  
Summarizing these empirical findings, Whitehouse (2018) recently proposed a 
theoretical model that aims to delineate the causal chain of events that leads to identity fusion 
with a group and, in turn, leads to self-sacrifice for that group. At the beginning of this model 
are dysphoric experiences shared with other members of the group (e.g., extreme initiation 
rites or war-related distress), which trigger exegetical reflection on the meaning of shared 
suffering and transform personal identity such that people perceive the dysphoric experiences 
as the essence of shared group membership (Jong, Whitehouse, Kavanagh, & Lane, 2015; 
Whitehouse et al., 2017). The experiential component of group membership causes identity 
fusion with the group, and fusion translates into psychological kinship with group members, 
which--interacting with an outgroup threat--may lead to self-sacrifice. In other words, fused 
people act as if other members of their group would be their genetic relatives--willing to 
sacrifice one’s life, especially in the context of inter-group warfare. 
 Here, we assess the last part of Whitehouse’s model, focusing on the role of outgroup 
relationships in moderating the effects of fusion with one’s group on sacrificial behavior. We 
capitalize on the intuitive appeal of the pictorial fusion measure (Fig. S1) that allowed us to 
deploy fusion measurements across a host of small-scale societies, ranging from hunter-
gathers, over pastoralists, to market-integrated (see Table 1). As the verbal fusion measure 
would be problematic at sites that do not use numeric representations (hence, answering on a 
scale is counterintuitive), the pictorial measure allowed us to assess fusion with ingroup and 
outgroup across all eight societies.  
However, instead of testing willingness to fight and die for one’s ingroup as is common 
in the identity fusion literature, we operationalized self-sacrificial behavior in economic terms 
as coins that one is willing to give up for other members of their ethnic and religious group. 
That is, we employed the Random Allocation Game (RAG henceforth; Hruschka et al., 2014; 
Purzycki et al., 2016b) where participants allocated 30 coins between themselves and 
anonymous members of their religious group residing in a geographically distant place (i.e., 
unlikely to ever reciprocate or retaliate). Utilizing natural dynamics between selfish and pro-
group behavior, this conceptualization of self-sacrifice as coins one sacrificed to the religious 
ingroup allowed us to measure continuous sacrificial behavior that should scale on the 
continuous pictorial measure of identity fusion. This avoids the assumption that self-sacrifice is 
a trait-like characteristic that needs a special, trait-like explanation (as assumed in 
Whitehouse’s model). Since the endowment presented a strong incentive for participants (30 
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coins were roughly equivalent to half a day’s wage of the local average income, except for the 
Hadza, who used tokens each worth 8 oz. of maize), we were able to overcome problems and 
biases inherent in self-reports (e.g., see Lang, Bahna, Shaver, Reddish, & Xygalatas, 2017) and 
measure actual self-sacrificial behavior. 
Furthermore, rather than treating outgroup threat as a group-level exogenous variable 
imposed on participants, we measured individual-level relationships to religious outgroup using 
the same pictorial measure as for assessing ingroup fusion, making these measures directly 
comparable (see Tables 1 and SX for raw fusion means across our sites and Fig. S2 for density 
plots). This is not to say that the group-level variation in outgroup threat is unimportant, quite 
the contrary; but rather than imposing an outgroup threat artificially at each site or specifically 
targeting samples afflicted with intergroup aggression, we let it emerge from individual-level 
measures by employing varying effects of outgroup relations across our sites. The same is true 
for our ingroup fusion measure, allowing us to assess whether the hypothesized Ingroup 
Fusion*Outgroup interaction will emerge at the individual level after accounting for site-specific 
variance of this relationship (see section S3.1). That is, we assessed whether increasing ingroup 
fusion together with decreasing outgroup relations will predict higher rates of coin sacrifice that 
benefits religious and co-ethnic ingroups. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Data availability 
The data we use are from the publicly available Evolution of Religion and Morality data set 
(Purzycki et al., 2016a). This article, the data set, all protocol materials, site descriptions, and 
sampling procedures are available here: https://github.com/bgpurzycki/Evolution-of-Religion-
and-Morality. The workflow for this specific project is and will be maintained at 
https://github.com/bgpurzycki/fusion. For results using this dataset for other purposes with 
other controls, see (Purzycki et al., 2016b, 2018). 
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1. The Random Allocation Game and sacrifice 
Our behavioral measure was the Random Allocation Game, which detects systematic dishonest 
favoritism (Hruschka et al., 2014; Jiang, 2013). As described in the main text, participants have 
the opportunity to put more coins into their own cups than chance would allow. Coins should 
follow a binomial distribution, but participants tend to systematically favor themselves. As such, 
foregoing this opportunity is a sacrifice of real gains. Moreover, the recipients are distant 
ingroup members; co-ethnic, co-religious individuals who share the same beliefs and 
backgrounds as participants, but they are not likely to directly reciprocate or retaliate. Rather 
than make sacrifices for ingroup members who may reciprocate at a later time, the sacrifices 
we measure are completely lost opportunities of gaining wealth. Participants played two 
games:  the Self Game (focused on here) and the Local Ingroup Game, where participants 
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allocated coins between another anonymous distant ingroup member and an anonymous local 
ingroup member. 
2.2.2. Intergroup relations 
To measure fusion, we used the visual scale from Swann Jr. et al. (2009; figure S1 is actual 
visualization we used with updated targets for “Other”) ported to numeric values of 1 to 5. The 
questions we asked with this scale were as follows (variable names in data set in parentheses): 
 Using these pictures, how emotionally close do you feel to     [a specifically 
defined geographically distant co-ethnic, co-religionist group?  
 Using these pictures, how emotionally close do you feel toward members of   
  [local co-religious, co-ethnic] group? 
 Using these pictures, how emotionally close do you feel toward     




Figure S1 | Visual fusion scale adapted from Swann, et al. (2009) modified from Schubert and Otten (2002). 
Participants pointed to that which best represents their attitudes towards various others. 
We also asked a question about participants’ ratings of religious similarity to distant recipients 
(scale from -2 to 2): 
 How similar are DISTANT’s traditions/religious beliefs and practices with the LOCAL? 
(CORELSIM) 
We do note that we are unsure as to whether or not overlapping circles function adequately as 
a metaphor for social relations across all contexts. In other words, the fusion measure might be 
too heavily reliant on a non-universal spatial metaphor. As illustrated below, we nevertheless 
found that by and large, individuals had far lower scores for ingroup fusion than its outgroup 
counterpart. 
2.2.3. Local vs. extended fusion 
The theory of identity fusion sketched above predicts that identity fusion is effective in 
facilitating pro-group behavior in interactions with both the local and extended ingroups 
(Swann, Buhrmester, et al., 2014; Swann, Gómez, Dovidio, et al., 2010). While participants are 
fused mainly with their ingroup (e.g. other Spaniards in the case of Swann et al. studies), they 
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are often willing to sacrifice themselves even for members of groups with whom they share 
superordinate group membership (Europeans). That is, the pro-kin bias apparent in interaction 
with local ingroups (Hamilton, 1964) is projected onto members of the extended ingroup, 
especially if they share common cultural or morphological characteristics (Swann, Buhrmester, 
et al., 2014). This notion has been further elaborated in Whitehouse’s model (Whitehouse, 
2018), which posits that participants must first experience local fusion evoked by shared 
dysphoric experiences (within their community) that can be later projected onto extended 
ingroups. 
In our current setup of the RAG, the money recipients from distant communities are 
extended ingroups, insofar as they are co-ethnic and co-religionist. We purposely selected 
distant ingroups due to having non-reciprocal relations participants because allocating to them 
lends itself to sacrifice inasmuch as the costs will never be directly reciprocated by those 
benefitting from them and it controls for any outgroup confounds. On the contrary, sacrificing 
resources to one’s ingroup members typically involves returns through nonkin (Trivers, 1971) 
and kin alike (Hamilton, 1964). By way of analogy, engaging in warfare can benefit a multitude 
of anonymous others—who aren’t fighting—from an external threat with no direct opportunity 
to reciprocate. Making a sacrifice of resources to one’s community however, can have direct 
benefits, thus giving the allocations an investment-like quality instead of sacrifice. 
Furthermore, we focused on ingroup fusion here primarily for the fact that the theory 
explicitly predicts that local fusion will predict sacrifice and represents the crucial basis of 
extended fusion. We nevertheless assessed the role of distant fusion on allocations by running 
the same main model and the model with only a simple and varying effect of local ingroup 
fusion (m1a and mg above) but replacing local ingroup fusion with distant ingroup fusion. Table 
S3 presents those results (section 3.4.2).  
2.3. Data notes 
While we have data for the Hadza’s fusion scores (as it was a visual scale to which participants 
pointed), we do not have data for their perceived religious similarity due to difficulty with 
numerical scales. As indicated by Figure S2, the distributions of their fusion scores were 
intuitive insofar as they felt emotionally closer to other Hadza than to Datoga herders. In the 
original data file, their scale was from 0 to 4, which was recoded to 1 to 5 to be consistent with 
the rest of the data. One individual in the Tyvan sample responded at the halfway point 
between 4 and 5 on the ingroup fusion scale. This was recoded as 5. 
2.4. Descriptive reporting 
Figure S2 is a density plot showing the cross-site distribution of ingroup and outgroup relation 
scores. Across sites, it is clear that people are rating their emotional proximity to ingroups more 
than their outgroups. In other words, participants were systematically more fused with their 




Figure S2 | Density plots of ingroup (orange) and outgroup (blue) fusion across eight field sites. Recoded scales 
were from 1 to 5. 
 Table S1 is a table of counts for participant Ingroup*Outgroup scores. The modal 
response in the matrix is high ingroup fusion (5) and low outgroup relations (1), totaling 146 
(26% of the sample). Figure S3 includes 2D surface plot of the raw allocation data across values 
for ingroup and outgroup ratings. Note that the data were interpolated in order to show 
continuous transitions between the outgroup and ingroup categories. Note too, that the peaks 
are misleading insofar as the plot surfaces are means. The two peaks represent a total of three 
participants (e.g., one individual with low ingroup fusion and high outgroup scores put 20 coins 
in the cup opposite to him or herself); see Table S1. 
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Table S1 | Participant responses to fusion questions of ingroups and outgroups. Left panel reports counts of 
participants and right panel reports means. 1 = lowest possible score (separate), 5 = maximum (fused). Bold values 








Figure S3 | 2D surface plot of raw data showing the interaction between ingroup fusion and outgroup relations in 
predicting DISTANT allocations. See Table S1 for data. 
3. Main Analyses 
3.1. Model definitions 
Recall that the linear component of our main model was defined as follows: 
logit(pi) = αS(i) + βS(i)*gi + γS(i)*oi + ψS(i)*gi*oi   (m1a) 
where g is the ingroup fusion value and o is the outgroup counterpart. We modelled their 
effects simply for individuals, denoted by subscript i, but also varying across groups, as denoted 
by the subscript s. The three other model specifications were as follows: 
logit(pi) = αS(i) + λs*ri + βS(i)*gi + γS(i)*oi + ψS(i)*gi*oi  (m1b) 
logit(pi) = αS(i) + βS(i)*gi     (mg) 





















5 1 4 4 3 20 32 20.00 14.50 16.00 14.33 13.05 13.94 
4 1 2 2 6 92 103 16.00 16.00 19.00 12.17 12.48 12.69 
3 2 5 12 13 27 59 16.50 13.60 15.25 12.77 14.00 14.03 
2 6 12 12 16 32 78 14.33 13.33 14.17 14.94 14.09 14.18 
1 81 12 20 40 146 299 14.78 15.08 13.80 13.60 13.85 14.11 
 
n 91 35 50 78 317 571 14.86 14.26 14.62 13.65 13.44 13.85 
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Equation m1b is the same as equation m1a, but adds the variable r, which represents reported 
religious similarity of distant players. Equations mg and mo are the simplest models, where 
ingroup and outgroup relations are treated as simple effects and effects varying across sites, 
respectively. The prior distribution definitions remain the same. We use the LKJCorr prior 
(where η = 4) to conservatively address extreme correlations (Lewandowski, Kurowicka, & Joe, 
2009; see McElreath, 2018, pp. 393-394). 
3.2. Analytical notes 
The analytical strategy we adopt here primarily focuses on the theories defined in the fusion 
literature. That is, we stick closely to the theory that has been developed by modelling it to the 
best of our ability, and not including other factors (e.g., conventional demographic “controls”) 
that may affect the game outcomes or absorb the effects. Specifically, Whitehouse (2018) 
predicts that perceived sharedness leads to local fusion which in turn leads to psychological 
kinship. Finally, outgroup threat moderates the relationship between psychological kinship and 
self-sacrifice. While we were not able to directly assess the perceived psychological kinship, we 
measured local fusion, hence we should observe the same effects as if we would use perceived 
psychological kinship (given it is a mediator). 
To model monotonic effects, we used the brms package (Bürkner, 2017; Version 2.1.0) 
for use in R (R Core Team, 2016). We attempted to model both outgroup and ingroup fusion as 
independent varying effects across groups, but models would not run, likely due to their inverse 
correlation and distributions (see Figure S2 above). All plots other than the density plots were 
created using the package ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009). Note that specific values in the Bayesian 
models may change slightly across software as the brms package and rstan set seeds 
differently. We set global and per-model seeds at 7. 
3.3. Results 
Table S2 reports the results from the main regression models. The gi*oi interaction is easiest to 
view in Figure S4, where the highest concentration of sacrificed coins—in yellow—is when 
outgroup relation scores are high (cf. Figure S2). Holding the effect of religious similarity 
constant (and removing the Hadza) shifts the concentration of sacrifice toward the higher end 
of the ingroup fusion scale. Figure S5 then displays the same results from model m1a across 
three levels of outgroup scores (min, middle, max) with 95% credibility intervals. The relatively 
wide credibility intervals for maximal levels of outgroup relations indicate that the predicted 
high allocations in this group (cf. Figure S4) were quite variable. Overall, however, these figures 





Figure S4 | Surface plot of individual-level interaction between ingroup and outgroup scores on allocation to 
distant ingroup cup. X-axis is ingroup (g) and y-axis is outgroup (o) scores. Left plot is model m1a and right plot is 
m1b. 
Figure S5 | Estimated means with 95% credibility intervals of allocations to distant ingroups across three levels 
of outgroup relations scores. Estimates from model m1a. The dashed line indicates impartial allocations (half of 
endowment) to religious ingroups. 
Table S2 | Estimates and 95% credibility intervals of models reported in main text (Figure 1). Varying effects for 
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3.4. Supplementary models 
3.4.1. Extensions to the main models 
In addition to the four main models, we ran a few additional model specifications for 
robustness checking purposes. In all of these models, we maximize sample size by not including 
the religious similarity variable, which would force dropping the Hadza. The first model (model 
ms in Table S2) varies only outgroup relations scores across sites (instead of the 
Outgroup*Ingroup fusion interaction), thus leaving the interaction effect only at the level of 
individuals: 
logit(pi) = αS(i) + γS(i)*oi + ψi*gi*oi  (ms) 
We also added model specifications identical to the main model (m1a), but with either one of 
two experimental checks included. As all participants played at least two counterbalanced 
variations of the experimental game (one where the cups specified were for ingroups instead of 
for participants and the other cup was for another anonymous distant co-religionist, co-ethnic), 
we hold constant the game order (model mt in Table S2). Some participants (Lovu, Mauritius, 
Tyva Republic, and Yasawans) also played in a treatment condition with religious primes (model 
mp in Table S2). We hold this constant as well. Note that across model specifications, the main 
results are robust to such controls and the results are qualitatively the same across all 
specifications. 
3.4.2. Extreme Cases 
As mentioned in the main text, much of the work focuses on the extreme ends of the fusion 
scale and dichotomizes the values where any response less than the extreme is “unfused.” For 
the sake of illustration, we include similar models as those defined above, but we dummy 
coded the fusion data; all ingroup fusion scores < 5 were recoded as zeroes and all of those on 
the extreme end were recoded as 1. Similarly, we recoded the outgroup relations data, but 
reversed the scale, so that all 1’s were recoded as 1 (i.e., the extreme opposite of fused) and all 
values > 1 were recoded as zero. Table S3 reports the frequencies of responses on the full data 
set (i.e., without missing values removed). 
 Note that for both ingroup and outgroup scales, Yasawans had floor effects. No 
individual considered themselves fused (i.e., 0% of the subsample answered the scale by 
pointing to the image representing fusion). Similarly, 99% of this subsample answered with the 
lowest possible value on this scale. Because of this, the dummy coded data did not provide 
sufficient within site variation to model. As such, the output of the regression analyses (Table 
S3) do not include Yasawans. This represents one methodological problem with post hoc 
dummy coding of such values in cross-cultural research. 
 As illustrated in Table S4, there were no substantive differences across dummy coded 
data and the main effects for ingroup fusion; ingroup fusion still shows a positive—but slight—
association with game allocations (cf. Tab. S1 and Tab. S3, model mg). Note that in model 
m1bin, the effect for Inland Tanna was quite strong; the overwhelming bulk of the effect’s 
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probability mass is on the positive side of zero (95% CI = -0.04, 0.27). Mauritius, on the other 
hand, showed the reverse effect (95% CI = -0.25, 0.04). However, it is worth pointing out that 
the coefficient sizes represent only a small increase/decrease of allocation probability around 
1.7%. 
On average, the reverse-and-dummy coded outgroup relations variable (called 
“detachment” in the table) showed no association with allocations. However, the output for 
model m2bin shows that it does have differential effects across sites. Outgroup detachment 
predicts sacrificing coins among the Coastal Tanna and Hadza samples while it predicts self-
favoritism among Marajó Brazilians and Mauritians.  Similar to the main interaction models in 
S2, on average, individuals who are fused with ingroup and detached from outgroups are less 
likely to sacrifice coins (though the effect is unreliable, -0.05, 95% CI = [-0.22, 0.11]). The site-
level ingroup*outgroup interaction parallels the varying effects in the outgroup model (m2bin). 
3.4.3. Local vs. extended fusion models 
Recall in section 2.2.3 where we discussed the distinction between local fusion and extended 
fusion. Table S5 reports these details. The results are qualitatively similar to the results of the 
target models; the interaction shows no association with game outcome, but distant ingroup 
fusion is associated with greater sacrifice. 
Table S3 | Frequencies and proportions of extreme values for ingroup (top) and outgroup (bottom) fusion. In the 
top panel, the proportions are those in the full data set who answered as “fused” (a value of 5). In the bottom 
panel, the proportions are those in the full data set who answered with a 1, the least fused. 












Coastal Tanna 3 3 5 9 22 42 0.52 
Hadza 1 1 5 3 58 68 0.85 
Inland Tanna 1 2 5 12 53 73 0.73 
Lovu 10 11 13 11 30 75 0.40 
Marajo 7 8 4 12 38 69 0.55 
Mauritius 2 2 11 23 57 95 0.60 
Tyva Republic 10 8 14 8 41 81 0.51 
Yasawa 3 68 2 0 0 73 0.00 
         













Coastal Tanna 29 5 3 0 5 42 0.69 
Hadza 41 14 3 3 6 67 0.61 
Inland Tanna 45 1 1 3 23 73 0.62 
Lovu 19 10 14 11 21 75 0.25 
Marajo 36 9 5 5 12 67 0.54 
Mauritius 38 25 11 9 12 95 0.40 
Tyva Republic 37 13 13 4 12 79 0.47 




Table S4 | Extreme value models. Models use dummy coded values for ingroup fusion (where 5 on the scale was 
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Table S5| Estimates and 95% credibility intervals of estimates for distant ingroup fusion models. Varying effects 
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3.4.4. The Individualist Game in the Tyva Republic 
In the main text, we speculated that the Ingroup*Outgroup interaction may be clearer in a self 
vs. ingroup game dyad. In this dyad, rather than a geographically distant ingroup, participants 
would sacrifice coins to their local ingroup at a cost to themselves. As we noted, Tyvans (n = 81) 
played this game, dubbed the “Individualist Game” (Purzycki & Kulundary, 2018). However, the 
fusion scores were not the focal component of the initial report.  Here, we apply a version of 
the main model reported in the text to the Tyvan data (m1tyva) along with a version without 
the proposed interaction (m2tyva): 
yi ~ Binomial(30, pi) 
logit(pi) = α + βg*gi + βo*oi + βgogi*oi (m1tyva) 
logit(pi) = α + βg*gi + βo*oi  (m2tyva) 
α, βg*gi, βo*oi, βgogi*oi ~ Normal(0,1) 
Here, yi denotes the allocations to Buddhist Tyvans in Kyzyl, g denotes fusion with Buddhist 
Tyvans from Kyzyl, and o denotes fusion with ethnic Russians from Ak Dovurak, a mining town 
in western Tyva. Again, we modelled effects monotonically. As this was a single site, we varied 
neither intercepts nor effects.  
Table S6 | Estimates and 95% credibility intervals of model defined above with sample from the Tyva Republic. 
Model names correspond to the code in the supplementary R script. 





















Table S6 reports the output showing that the ingroup-outgroup interaction had no association 
with outcome in the games (m1tyva). Note, however, that ingroup fusion did predict 
withholding coins from the local group. Note, too, that Tyvans largely played fairly (if a little 
generous; mean allocations to the ingroup was 15.23, SD = 2.88), thus making it difficult to infer 
what similar effects would be like in contexts with greater general withholding. Other analyses 
of the Tyvan data are reported elsewhere, but the fusion measures were not a focus of those 
analyses (Purzycki & Kulundary, 2018). 
4. Supplementary Frequentist Analyses 
In this section, we provide additional analyses using frequentist analytical techniques as a 
robustness check for the findings produced by our main Bayesian models. First, as a quasi-
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manipulation-check, we examined the correlation between ingroup and outgroup relations, 
assessing whether heightened ingroup fusion comes at the expense of decreased outgroup 
relations scores. Contrary to this prediction, we observed a moderate positive correlation 
between these two measures (Pearson’s r = 0.28, 95% CI = [0.21 – 0.35]), suggesting that the 
pictorial measure may capture general sociality rather than relationship to specific groups. 
Despite this finding, 26% of our sample indicated maximum fusion with ingroup and 
simultaneously minimal fusion with outgroup whereas only 14% indicated general prosociality 
(maximum on both fusion measures, see Tab. S1). This result indicates that a sufficiently high 
number of participants reported the purported negative relationship, lending credibility to our 
subsequent analyses. 
 First, we analyzed the simple effects of ingroup and outgroup scores on allocations to 
distant ingroups, varying these effects across sites. These analyses revealed that an increase of 
one on the pictorial ingroup fusion measure was associated with an increase of 0.6% in the 
likelihood of allocating a coin to religious ingroups (instead to the self). That is, the increase 
from minimum to maximum levels of ingroup fusion was associated with a 3% increase in the 
likelihood of coin sacrifice. Similar results were obtained for the outgroup measure, where an 
increase of one was associated with 0.4% increase in the likelihood of allocating to distant 
ingroups. In addition to the aforementioned correlation, these results also suggest that, at least 
in our sites, the measure of fusion was not sensitive to targeted groups (ingroup vs. outgroup), 
and instead measured general prosociality. Indeed, the coefficients of both measures were 
positive (see Table S5, Models fg and fo). 
 However, it could be argued that our data were generated by two processes, which 
mask the purported effects of outgroup hostility. That is, the effects of outgroup hostility on 
extreme ingroup sacrifice can be observed only for participants reporting high levels of ingroup 
fusion and low levels of outgroup relations; whereas reporting a mixture of positive ingroup 
and outgroup scores leads to a small sacrifice corresponding to general prosociality. To 
investigate this proposition, we interacted ingroup and outgroup scores and assessed the 
effects of this interaction on coin allocations to religious ingroups. The raw data (ignoring 
within-site nesting) are displayed in Fig. S3.  The surface plots reveal that the highest allocations 
were in the segment of maximal fusion with outgroups and minimal fusion with ingroups. On 
the contrary, the predicted region of interest (high ingroup and low outgroup scores) exhibited 
low mean allocations. However, recall that the raw data are misleading due to low number of 
participants in some of these extreme segments (see Tab. S1). 
To investigate this matter more rigorously, we attempted to build a multi-level binomial 
model, varying the Ingroup*Outgroup interaction across sites. However, fitting this model in R 
(R Core Team, 2016) using the glmer function in the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015, p. 4) revealed poor convergence of this model, despite trying several optimizers. 
Hence, we were forced to divide our outgroup measure into simpler categories (1-2 = 0; 3-4 = 1; 
5 = 2) in order to reach convergence. This problem bolsters the utility of the Bayesian 
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framework when analyzing multi-level data with effects varying across nesting factors. Also 
note that compared to the Bayesian models m1a and m1b, we treat the ingroup and outgroup 
measures as continuous in the frequentist analyses (instead of modelling them as monotonic 
effects). 
The results of the interaction model suggest that the slope of ingroup fusion predicting 
allocations to religious ingroups is more positive for low levels of outgroup scores (see Table 
S7). However, as can be seen in Fig. S6, these differences are driven by participants reporting 
low ingroup fusion; the intercepts differ across the three levels of outgroup relations such that 
higher outgroup scores are associated with larger allocations to distant ethnic and religious 
ingroups (cf. Figure S5). In other words, for maximum levels of ingroup fusion, outgroup 
relations do not play a role because all participants tended to split the endowment impartially 
between themselves and distant ingroups (while the theory predicts highest allocations for low 
levels of outgroup relations). Instead, the difference in slopes was driven by participants who 
indicated low levels of both the ingroup and outgroup measures; such participants were the 
most selfish. For completeness, we also report the same analyses using fusion with distant 
ingroups rather than local ingroups in Table S5 (cf. Table S3). 
Figure S6 | Estimated regression lines from the multi-level binomial model across three levels of outgroup 
relations scores. While the slope of ingroup fusion when outgroup scores equal one or two is more positive 
compared to slopes across other levels of outgroup relations, this effect does not lead to larger amounts of 
sacrificed coins. Quite the contrary, maximal ingroup fusion led to impartial coin allocations across all levels of 
outgroup relations scores, indicating that the pictorial fusion measure assesses general prosociality. It is the lack of 
fusion with any group that drives the difference – such participants are more selfish. Note: the y-axis displays 
logistic transformations of the raw estimates to indicate probability of allocating a coin to religious ingroup. The 
dashed line indicates impartial allocations (half of endowment) to religious ingroups.
Table S7 | Estimates and 95% confidence intervals for frequentist models. Varying effects for 
ingroup fusion are denoted with (g) and outgroup with an (o). We also present models with distant 
fusion (c). 
 












-0.25 -0.20 -0.30 -0.21 -0.27 
[-0.44, -0.05] [-0.31, -0.08] [-0.49, -0.11] [-0.35, -0.06] [-0.50, -0.04] 
Ingroup/Distant 
0.03 -- 0.04 0.02 0.03 
[-0.01, 0.06] -- [-0.001, 0.07] [-0.01, 0.04] [-0.01, 0.06] 
Outgroup 
-- 0.02 -- -- -- 
-- [-0.01, 0.05] -- -- -- 
Outg. = 1 
-- -- 0.67 -- 0.33 
-- -- [-0.04, 1.39] -- [0.20., 0.85] 
Outg. = 2 
-- -- 0.30 -- 0.28 
-- -- [-0.31, 0.92] -- [-0.14, 0.69] 
Ing./Dist.*Outg. = 1 
-- -- -0.15 -- -0.06 
-- -- [-0.30, 0.01] -- [-0.19, 0.06] 
Ing./Dist.*Outg. = 2 
-- -- -0.05 -- -0.05 
-- -- [-0.18, 0.08] -- [-0.15, 0.05] 
Coastal Tannese -0.11 -0.08 -0.16 -0.12 -0.06 
Hadza -0.61 -0.35 -0.63 -0.43 -0.68 
Inland Tannese -0.24 -0.18 -0.30 -0.19 -0.24 
Indo-Fijians -0.06 -0.09 -0.15 -0.07 -0.06 
Marajó Brazilians -0.11 -0.14 -0.22 -0.09 -0.10 
Mauritians -0.29 -0.24 -0.34 -0.23 -0.29 
Tyvans 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 
Yasawan-Fijians -0.54 -0.45 -0.55 -0.50 -0.78 
Coastal Tannesev 0.01 0.01 0.51/0.12 -- 0.08/0.02 
Hadzav 0.05 -0.01 1.07/0.75 -- 0.81/0.78 
Inland Tannesev 0.03 0.02 0.67/0.28 -- 0.29/0.24 
Indo-Fijiansv 0.01 0.02 0.49/0.05 -- 0.07/0.02 
Marajó Braziliansv 0.01 0.03 0.57/0.21 -- 0.12/0.06 
Mauritiansv 0.03 0.03 0.72/0.40 -- 0.34/0.29 
Tyvansv 0.01 0.03 0.39/-0.02 -- -0.04/-0.10 
Yasawa-Fijiansv 0.05 0.01 0.97/0.63 -- 0.92/0.90 
vVaried effect g o g*o=1/g*o=2 c c*o=1/c*o=2 
Model (R script) fg fo fgo fc fco 
Note: Compared to Bayesian models (Table S2), the frequentist models do not display 95% CI for 
varying effects. Ingroup/Distant show coefficients for ingroup and distant fusion, respectively. The 
model fc does not contain site-specific intercepts due to convergence issues. 
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5. Supplementary Discussion 
In summary, these results suggest that lack of fusion with any group is generally associated with 
selfishness whereas increasing fusion with either outgroup or ingroup increases willingness to 
sacrifice coins for distant ingroups. In other words, the effect of outgroups appears to be 
additive rather than multiplicative. In our sample, the measure of outgroup relations worked as 
an indicator of general pro-group orientation. Nevertheless, these results are limited by two 
possibilities. First, it could be argued that the structure of the RAG, where impartial money 
allocation between oneself and religious ingroup is according to the rules of the game, capped 
possible extreme sacrificial behavior for the ingroup. Allocating more than half of one’s 
endowment to religious ingroups would mean breaking the rules of the game, hence we could 
not observe extreme behaviors in the region of interest (maximal ingroup and minimal 
outgroup scores). On the other hand, the identity fusion literature often works with extreme—
but hypothetical—scenarios such as jumping from a bridge to stop a trolley with one’s body; 
thus, breaking the rules in an anonymous game to sacrifice more coins for the ingroup perhaps 
should not be that difficult for highly fused participants; there is no a priori reason to discount 
subtler forms of sacrifice and the theory does not speak to this subtlety. Second, to avoid 
confounds, we avoided selected outgroups engaging in outright warfare with the ingroups, 
though intergroup relations definitely varied (e.g., the Hadza and Datoga have a long-standing 
feud and often violent confrontations while Catholic and Evangelical Brazilians have largely 
peaceable relations). While the effects of outgroup hostility should be observed even in 
situations that lack direct between-group conflict (groups still compete), intensified inter-group 
conflict might limit the extreme outgroup scores we found in our sample and motivate people 
to allocate more coins to ingroups. 
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